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Wednesday 20 May 2015

Trident Whistle-blower Navy Engineer William McNeilly in custody of failed UK State

William has been on the run since he gave a 19 page report of the safety problems with Trident Nuclear weapons. Wills report echos the revelations of less well know whistle-blowers who  also had to escape the UK for fear of reprisals.   


The Courage Foundation has opened an emergency fund for Trident whistleblower William McNeilly’s defence costs.
Able Seaman William McNeilly is a 25-year-old British Engineering Technician Weapons Engineer Submariner who has blown the whistle on major safety risks and cover-ups within the British Royal Navy’s Trident nuclear weapons programme, stating, “We are so close to a nuclear disaster it is shocking, and yet everybody is accepting the risk to the public.”
William McNeilly released a 16-page report to WikiLeaks, who published the original in full. The report draws on McNeilly’s experience in the Royal Navy to detail security lapses, safety hazards and a culture of secrecy and cover-up. In particular, McNeilly describes surprisingly weak security around the UK’s Trident nuclear submarine base, writing that “it’s harder to get into most nightclubs than it is to get into the [restricted] Green Area.”
McNeilly has turned himself in to police and is now being held in Royal Navy custody at an undisclosed location, where he faces potential prosecution. Whilst it is yet unclear what charges McNeilly will face, he is in military custody and the UK has a number of military charges that, like the Espionage Act in the United States, do not offer defendants the chance to make a public interest defence.
Regarding his reasons for acting as he has done, McNeilly explained the difficulty of achieving results through regular channels: “I’m releasing this information in this way because it’s the only way I can be sure it gets out. I raised my concerns about the safety and security of the weapon system through the chain of command on multiple occasions. My concern couldn’t have been any clearer.”
The Courage Foundation is taking McNeilly on as an emergency case, providing a defence fund immediately for the public to donate to, ensuring its possible for him to mount the best defence from the start.
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, which is based at Falsane in Scotland, has been the subject of increasing domestic controversy over recent months as the latest possible date for a political decision on its renewal draws near. The Scottish National Party, whose MPs won 56 of Scotland’s 59 parliamentary seats in the recent General Election, is strongly opposed to a Trident replacement being commissioned.
Among the most startling of McNeilly’s revelations include the fact that three missile launch tests failed, missile safety alarms were ignored, torpedo compartments were flooded and bags were not properly checked for security risks. He also claims that HMS Vanguard crashed into a French submarine in February 2009. McNeilly says there was a “massive cover up of the incident. For the first time the no personal electronic devices with a camera rule was enforced.” At the time, the Guardian reported that “the Ministry of Defence initially refused to confirm the incident” and that Vanguard suffered mere “scrapes”, but McNeilly says one officer told him, “We thought, this is it – we’re all going to die.”
A serving submariner has given a damning account of life onboard a Trident submarine earlier this year, describing the vessels as “a disaster waiting to happen”.  William McNeilly was training to work on the Trident nuclear weapons system.  He was on HMS Victorious during a three-month operational patrol which ended in April. He has published a detailed account of technical defects, security breaches and poor safety practice. The Navy has written down detailed procedures for safety and security with regard to Trident. McNeilly reveals that these rules are casually ignored on a daily basis. His account was reported by Rob Edwards in the Sunday Herald. The editorial in the paper argues that the whistleblowers report should spell the death knell for Trident.
John Ainslie, Coordinator of Scottish CND, said:
"McNeilly is a whistleblower who has revealed that there is a callous disregard for safety and security onboard Trident submarines.  He should be commended for his action, not hounded by the Ministry of Defence.  He has exposed the fact that Trident is a catastrophe waiting to happen - by accident, an act of terrorism or sabotage.  We are told that nuclear weapons keep us safe. This report shows that Trident puts us all in great danger.  McNeilly’s report would make a good script for a disaster movie.  Alarms warnings are muted, safety regulations ignored, shortcuts taken, exam results falsified and major defects overlooked. What he says is credible.  Official reports show that the number of safety incidents is very high and rising. McNeilly reveals what this actually means in practice."
This is the Petition organised by Scottish CND to support William and ask that he not be prosecuted.  https://www.change.org/p/david-cameron-pardon-the-trident-whistleblower
Accident risk
One major concern is a fire in the Missile Compartment, which houses 8 Trident D5 missiles. Each missile contains tonnes of high explosive rocket fuel, topped with several 100-kiloton nuclear warheads. McNeilly describes an earlier incident on a Trident submarine. Toilet rolls, stacked in the Missile Compartment, caught fire. This filled several of the decks of the compartment with smoke.  The crew struggled to bring the incident under control and had difficulty using their Breathing Apparatus. 
Despite this earlier incident, he found that the risk of a fire in the Missile Compartment wasn’t taken seriously.  A major fire in the missile area can only be brought under control by flooding the compartment with Nitrogen. However the Nitrogen cylinders were significantly below the required pressure. Restrictions on personal electronic equipment, which could trigger an electrical fire, were not enforced. McNeilly told his superiors about rubbish near the missiles, which could have caused a fire. But no action was taken.
Elsewhere on the submarine there was a real risk of an electrical fire. No attempt was made to isolate electrical equipment after a leak was detected in the riders’ mess (riders are extra personnel on the vessel).  There were serious problems with condensation in parts of the submarine. A sprinkler system was accidentally activated in the torpedo room, without the electrical system having been isolated.
Crew members who work on the Trident missile system should have a thorough knowledge of CB8890, the manual for Trident safety and security. However McNeilly’s exam on the manual was a sham. Some who missed the test were allocated results at random.  One of the more senior staff said that the students didn’t really need to study the whole manual.
The status of the Trident missiles is monitored at the Control and Monitoring Panel (CAMP). This should be manned at all times, but often it was not. An audible alarm on the panel was muted because it was going off repeatedly. A second recurring alarm in the Missile Control Compartment, due to a problem with power from one of the Turbo Generators, was also ignored.
One of the more hazardous operations conducted by missile engineers is the insertion of DC/AC inverters in the missiles before a patrol and their removal after a patrol. To do this they have to open a hatch in each missile tube and gain direct access to the missiles. McNeilly describes how the removal of inverters at the end of their patrol was rushed and they did not follow the written procedures. 
The Navy is finding it difficult to recruit and train Trident missile engineers. The report from this submariner shows that they are placing people in positions of responsibility without adequate training and/or experience.
Other safety issues identified by McNeilly are:
•There was a list of defects on the Trident missile system on HMS Victorious and the list was almost full.
•One of the decks in the Missile Compartment was used as a gym and weights were thrown and dropped near missile equipment.
•Extra beds blocked access to DC switch boards & a hydraulics isolation valve.
•Use of banned substance in cleaning material, causing problems with fumes.
•The circumstances of the collision between HMS Vanguard and Le Triomphant in February 2009 are a closely guarded secret, but one Vanguard crew member said “We thought, this is it we’re all going to die”.
•There was an incident when a generator compartment was flooded on a submarine and this could have resulted in the loss of the vessel if it had been handled differently.
Defects on Trident submarines
McNeilly says that at the end of the patrol they tested the Missile Compensation System on HMS Victorious. This system should quickly restore the balance of the submarine after a missile is launched, to enable each subsequent missile to be fired. The test was carried out three times, and each time the test failed.
The missile hatches on the submarine are powered by the Main Hydraulic Plant. At the end of the patrol they should have tested that they would have been able to open the hatches if required. But they were unable to conduct the test because of seawater in the hydraulic system.
These two problems meant that they could not confirm that the submarine could have launched its missiles when on patrol.
McNeilly says that there was noise from the aft diving planes when the vessel submerged at the start of its patrol and that this was part of a wider issue of aft diving planes jamming. Jammed planes can lead to the loss of the submarine in an uncontrolled dive.
There were problems with the Turbo Generators, which provide the main power source, and with one of the diesel generators, which are the back-up power source.  The safety of the submarine would be compromised if both sources of electrical power were lost.
In addition to these problems on HMS Victorious, McNeilly refers to defects on other submarines. He says that there are currently only two operational Trident submarines, probably due to refit and maintenance cycles, and that there are major defects on both the operational vessels. 
He visited a Trident submarine in the shiplift and many of the items of equipment were tagged with red markers, either for maintenance or defects. When they were told not to touch anything in the submarine’s control room, one of the crew responded “nothing works, you can touch what you like”.
Security breaches
McNeilly revealed two major breaches of security on HMS Victorious.  Despite not having DV security clearance, he was given access to Top Secret information showing where the submarine was carrying out its patrol. He also says he could have worked out the key to the Weapons Engineering Officer’s safe when he watched him enter the combination. This would have given the junior crew member unauthorised access to the trigger which launches Trident missiles. In addition, McNeilly was told of an officer who frequently left Top Secret documents lying on his bed.
He says there was a lack of adequate security controlling access to Trident submarines:
•The QM sentry (sailor in sentry box at gang plank) not an effective security check, as the sentry routinely lets people pass unchecked.
•MOD Police/Guard Force pass checks and gate checks not thorough.  Able to pass without showing face, including when raining.  Possible for extra people to get in as part of a group. Lots of missing RN ID cards circulating.
•Electronic gate access with PIN not working.
•No checks on bags being taken onto submarine by sailors or civilians. He was able to leave his bags next to the missiles on his first visit to a submarine.
Sloppy practice
McNeilly described how at times, such as the loading of stores before patrol, the submarine was chaotic. At the end of the patrol both the junior ranks and the senior ranks toilets were flooded and he notes that this was an apt summary of the state of affairs on this deadly nuclear-armed vessel.
Credibility of McNeilly’s report
While it is not possible to confirm many of the points made in McNeilly’s report, there is evidence to substantiate some of his remarks.
He says that Trident missile operators are been given responsibility too quickly without adequate training or experience. The Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator has said that a shortage of Suitably Qualified and Experience Personnel (SQEP) is the primary risk to the Defence Nuclear Programme (DNP). In his 2012/13 report the regulator said, “The ability of the Department to sustain a sufficient number of nuclear suitably competent military and civilian personnel is a long standing issue. It is identified as a significant threat to the safe delivery of the DNP”.  It remained the number one issue in the regulator’s 2013/14 report. Changes have been made to training under the Sustainable Submarine Manning Project.  Some individuals can be fast tracked through their training and experience.
McNeilly describes how, in the US Navy, two submariners go inside the missile tube, one on top of the other, to remove the DC/AC inverters from the missiles at the end of a patrol. A photo taken on US Navy Trident submarine confirms that this is the case. It shows the leg and foot of one man who is lying inside the missile tube. A second man is on the ladder facing inside, on top of the first man. A third sailor is in the foreground.
 















McNeilly mentions finding rubbish in the missile compartment, reporting this to superiors and no action being taken. One of the duties of a Missile Technician on a US submarine is to patrol the Missile Compartment looking for hazards like this. UK practice is likely to be the same, at least in theory.
McNeilly describes hearing of a fire in the missile compartment of a Trident submarine. While there is no other public evidence of this incident, the description of problems with a lack of adequate breathing apparatus is consistent with recorded accounts of fires on Royal Navy submarines. His claim that a very small fire can produce a lot of smoke on a submarine is confirmed by other sources.
He describes how it is possible to walk through security barriers without your pass being properly checked.  In October 1988 a protestor from Faslane Peace Camp was able to walk through several checkpoints, onto a Polaris submarine and then into the vessel’s Control Room (Herald report). In November 2000 a car-load of tourists accidentally drove into Faslane and was able to get through the checkpoint without any passes (source).
McNeilly quotes CB8890, the instructions for the safety and security of the Trident II D5 strategic weapon system. There is a reference to this manual in a defence safety review. The paragraphs from CB8890 which he quotes are similar to nuclear safety documents which have been released under the Freedom of Information Act.  
The submariner’s report suggests that there are a high number of breaches of safety procedures on Trident submarines. This is consistent with an acknowledged rise in nuclear incidents. The number of nuclear safety incidents at Faslane and Coulport rose from 68 in 2012/13 to 105 in 2013/14 (source). Between 2008/09 and 2012/13 there were 316 nuclear safety events, 71 fires and 3,243 “near miss” incidents at Faslane and Coulport (source). There were 44 fires on Royal Navy nuclear submarines between 2009 and 2013 (source).



Sunday 3 May 2015

Serial Pedophile Lord Janner and the Criminal Justice system that protects him and persecutes victims and whistle-blowers

Rape Of Justice 
Evidence doctored. Witnesses threatened. The damning child sex abuse dossier that alleges Lord Janner was allowed to molest young boys by one of Britain's highest ranking police chiefs
Guy Adams investigates   
Then MP Greville Janner with young schoolchildren when he was President of the Board of Deputies and lay leader of the British Jewish community
Then MP Greville Janner with young schoolchildren when he was President of the Board of Deputies and lay leader of the British Jewish community
The tale of corruption and criminality is so sinister that it might have been plucked from the plot of a late-night TV drama.
At its heart is a famous politician with a dark secret: he has for years been living a vile double life as a prolific abuser of children.
His crimes are known to the forces of law and order in the city that he represents. Yet the local police chief, a close friend and fellow Freemason, works to ensure that he is never brought to justice.
At one point, when the ‘untouchable’ Parliamentarian is threatened with exposure, in a messy court case, local detectives falsify criminal evidence in an effort to protect him.
Soon afterwards, the politician sends ‘heavies’ to knock on the doors of witnesses, in the hope of intimidating them into staying silent.
Then allies in City Hall instruct staff to shred documents that might result in his repellent activities becoming public.
Finally, the police chief launches an organised campaign to destroy the reputation of a brave whistle-blower who is attempting to expose the whole, stinking business.
As a result, the abuse continues unchecked, on an industrial scale. Dozens, if not scores, more vulnerable children are abused. Many still bear the scars to this day.
At the heart of the alleged conspiracy to protect Lord Janner is Michael Hirst (pictured). He was the Chief Constable of Leicestershire for much of the 1980s
At the heart of the alleged conspiracy to protect Lord Janner is Michael Hirst (pictured). He was the Chief Constable of Leicestershire for much of the 1980s
Corruption being a two-way street, the politician, meanwhile, helps funnel public money to the very police force whose bosses are helping him stay out of jail.
Sounds appalling, doesn’t it? But these deeply disturbing events have not been taken from a fictitious crime novel or TV script.
Instead, they are contained in a dossier of legal documents which outline events that took place in a British city during the 1980s and 1990s.
That city is Leicester. And the politician is Greville Janner, the Labour Peer and former MP who has in recent weeks been accused of countless child sex crimes, over a career that spanned four decades. His family have strenuously denied any such wrong-doing.
The fate of the 86-year-old is at the centre of a political storm after Alison Saunders, the Director of Public Prosecutions, decided that he should never be tried for his alleged crimes, which include 16 indecent assaults, and six counts of buggery, against nine children, because he is suffering from dementia.
In light of the ensuing controversy, which has seen more than 30 extra victims come forward, the aforementioned legal dossier, which I obtained a copy of this week, makes explosive reading.
Comprising dozens of letters, affidavits, witness statements and hundreds of pages of court papers, it offers a contemporaneous take from someone close to the case on how he believed Janner both committed his vile crimes and got away with them.
At the heart of the alleged conspiracy is a man called Michael Hirst. He was the Chief Constable of Leicestershire for much of the 1980s, and went on to become a director of the private security company Group 4.
According to the legal papers, which date from the early 1990s, Mr Hirst just happened to be ‘very close friends’ with Greville Janner. Both men, the dossier alleges, were Freemasons.
As a result of their relationship, it claims that Janner was protected from prosecution — even though his ‘activities with young boys’ were ‘well known by police’.
Although they knew that the MP had ‘been at it for years,’ junior officers said he was ‘never arrested, because strings are always pulled up above’.
Kelvyn Ashby at his home in Syston, Leicestershire.  Mr Ashby investigated Greville Janner in 1991
Kelvyn Ashby at his home in Syston, Leicestershire.  Mr Ashby investigated Greville Janner in 1991
In return, the documents claim, Janner repeatedly ‘stood up in Parliament asking for more money for Leicestershire constabulary.’ They also suggest that Janner’s criminal activities spanned several towns, regions and police jurisdictions.
In the market town of Coalville, for example, he ‘was involved setting up young homosexuals with flats in Agar Nook [a deprived housing estate] with the East Midlands Housing Association, and then calling round for payment in kind’.
At Leicester’s Holiday Inn, where the MP often stayed, the documents claim a witness ‘remembered the management closing the swimming pool to hotel guests, allowing Janner to swim in the pool with a young boy’.
In London, where he lived with his wife and children, and spent most weeknights, the papers allege that ‘the Met [police] at Notting Hill have a file relating to Janner and young boys’.
As far away as Scotland, an alleged victim approached staff at Edinburgh West Police Station in July 1991 and ‘made allegations of being buggered by Greville Janner while … on holiday for two weeks in Scotland alone with Janner’.
At this point, it should be stressed that the incriminating version of events outlined in the papers was compiled by one man.
Though it dovetails with much wider evidence about Janner’s alleged crimes, and seems at times to be forensically detailed (with statements and affidavits from multiple supporting witnesses), it was never properly tested in court.
The author was Ian Henning, a legal investigator (and former police officer) who had once worked on the defence team of a notorious convicted paedophile called Frank Beck.
Mr Beck, a former Liberal councillor and children’s home manager from Leicester, was, in 1991, given five life sentences, plus a further 24 years jail, for abusing youngsters in his care.
Owing to the severity of the crimes (police claimed Beck had abused 200 victims), the evidence at his trial was deeply shocking.
Lord Janner's Hampstead home. He transferred ownership of his apartment to his three children in the same month his Parliamentary office was searched by police last year
Lord Janner's Hampstead home. He transferred ownership of his apartment to his three children in the same month his Parliamentary office was searched by police last year
The trial also revealed a sensational side plot in which a witness claimed to have been repeatedly abused by Janner during the 1970s, when he’d been aged between 14 and 16.
The witness, by the time of the court case a married father of three in his 30s, gave a credible account of being subjected to a terrifying sexual assault at the MP’s London home, while Janner’s wife and children were away.
He claimed to have then had an illegal sexual relationship with Janner which lasted for almost two years.
The man showed the jury affectionate letters from the MP, talked of being given expensive presents by him and told how he’d been taken to the Houses of Parliament, Labour HQ, and a string of expensive hotels.
Their abusive relationship only ended, he claimed, when he moved into a home run by Beck, who forbade him from seeing the MP. 
Defence lawyers therefore attempted to use his testimony to argue that Beck was a protector, rather than abuser of boys. They described him as a ‘fall guy’ who was being prosecuted to protect the MP. The jury, of course, disagreed.
But after the 1991 conviction, Ian Henning, an employee of Leicester law firm Greene D’Sa, remained convinced of Beck’s innocence, and Janner’s guilt. He began working on an appeal.
It had the support of prisoners’ rights campaigner and Labour peer Lord Longford (who also believed in Beck’s innocence) and was to be handled in court by Anthony Scrivener, a QC famed for representing the Guildford Four (whose convictions were quashed after being wrongly jailed for 15 years for blowing up two pubs in the Surrey town in an IRA bombing campaign).
The documents quoted on these pages were all produced by Henning for that appeal.
As well as advocating Beck’s innocence, they offer a hair-raising, first-hand take on both Greville Janner’s alleged involvement in the case and its purported cover-up.
One of the papers is a witness statement written in 1993.
In it, Henning claims that during the run-up to Beck’s 1991 trial, junior police officers repeatedly told him that they were also investigating Janner for alleged child abuse.
‘On more than one occasion, police officers said “you must be the only bloke in Leicester who doesn’t know what he [Janner] gets up to”,’ it reads. ‘Police officers would be challenging and vociferous in making remarks such as “oh, it’s well known,” or “I’ve known about him for years”.’
The same police officers also claimed the MP was being protected by Chief Constable Hirst, Henning states.
Often, they would remark that ‘Janner and the chief constable are close personal friends’, or ask: ‘Why do you think that he [Janner] keeps standing up in Parliament asking for more money for Leicestershire Constabulary? No other Leicester MP does.


Labour Peer and former MP Lord Janner has in recent weeks been accused of countless child sex crimes, over a career that spanned four decades
‘One remark repeatedly made to me by numerous police officers while referring to Janner was “you’re in Leicester now and anything to do with Greville Janner will be covered up”.’
And so it proved.
Elsewhere in the 1993 document, which runs to 38 pages, Henning tells how, on May 11, 1990, detectives visited the home of Jennifer Lesiakowski, a former care home resident who alleged that she had been raped by Frank Beck.
They took a statement, and persuaded her to give evidence for the prosecution at his trial.
‘In her statement, [Lesiakowski] made reference to Greville Janner MP,’ Henning writes. ‘However, on May 17, 1990, the police officers returned to Lesiakowski with a typed copy of her original statement in which all reference to Greville Janner had been edited out.’
The documents also talk of how murky efforts began to be made to silence the alleged male Janner victim who intended to speak for the defence at the 1991 trial (and was by then living in Barnsley, South Yorkshire).
‘[He] was approached on two occasions by people who stated that they were representatives of Greville Janner and warned of the consequences for the witness, his wife and three young children if he attended any court hearing,’ Henning’s statement continues.
Henning says: ‘I assisted the witness to report these threats to the South Yorkshire and Leicestershire constabularies, as it was a deliberate attempt to pervert the course of justice and frightened [the victim] and his family.’
As a result of the sinister visits, the victim moved home. But attempts to intimidate him continued.
‘During October 1991, [the victim] told me [Henning] that the tenants who moved into his old address answered a knock at their front door to two men who stated that they had been sent by Greville Janner to warn [the victim] not to give evidence in the Beck trial.’
These shady figures weren’t the only people apparently attempting to protect Janner in the run-up to Beck’s trial, however. So, too, were Leicester social services, in whose homes many of Janner’s purported victims had lived.
With regard to the man intended to testifty in court, Henning claims that ‘all mention of Greville Janner had been removed from [his] Social Services file.’
‘The “Befriender” record, which regulations require be affixed to the inside of the front cover of all Social Service files, detailing any period a child spends away from the Children’s Home with a “befriender”, was missing.’
Other files which might have exposed Janner’s abuse of other children were simply destroyed.
‘In early February 1991, I received information that files relating to the children who had attended the Beeches Children’s Home during the “Beck era” had been taken by the gardener to County Hall, where a council employee ... had shredded them,’ Henning writes.
Lord Janner (right) sponsored Lord Carey of Clifton, who was previously Archbishop of Canterbury, on his introduction into the House of Lords in 2002
Lord Janner (right) sponsored Lord Carey of Clifton, who was previously Archbishop of Canterbury, on his introduction into the House of Lords in 2002
Eventually, two of the relatively junior detectives working on the case — named as Mick Creedon and Kelvyn Ashby — were told by their superiors to drop all inquiries into the MP.
‘There is no doubt in my mind that initially both Detective Inspector Ashby and Detective Sergeant Creedon intended to arrest Greville Janner,’ reads a different legal paper, compiled by Henning in 1991. ‘But as time progressed, using their own words, “we were prevented from doing so by higher ranking officers”.
Both Ashby and Creedon have recently confirmed that version of events. Creedon — now Chief Constable of Derbyshire — says the decision to stop investigating Janner ‘was taken by people more senior than me’. Did those ‘senior’ people include Chief Constable Hirst?
Creedon has so far declined to name names to the Press, though he may be more forthcoming to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which is now investigating this affair. Creedon charged with investigating Janner, now says he was just obeying orders to allow Janner to continue to rape more children. But who's orders?
As for Hirst, he is unable to pass comment, having died. But his widow, Ruth, denies that he was either a Freemason or a particularly close friend of the MP.
‘I think Michael thought Janner was guilty,’ she said this week. ‘I don’t know who made the decision not to arrest [Janner] but I suspect it was somebody higher up than Michael.’
One thing Hirst certainly did preside over, however, was a bizarre and — in retrospect — very sinister attempt to silence Ian Henning in the months and years that followed the Beck trial.
It began in late 1991, when Leicestershire police announced that Henning would no longer be considered a ‘suitable person to attend an interview of a suspect or person in custody at a police station’.
In a letter to Henning’s law firm Greene D’Sa, they added that the force had written to both the Law Society and the Solicitors Complaints Bureau to have Henning struck off, on the grounds that (among other things) he’d improperly briefed the media about Janner’s involvement in the Beck case.
Henning, who denied that allegation, was then arrested. His house was searched and several documents and items of evidence relating to Janner seized, never to be seen again.
It took ten months for police to announce that no charges would actually be filed against him. In the meantime, he won leave to seek a judicial review of the decision to ban him from doing legal work in police stations.
‘My arrest was a response by the Leicestershire Constabulary to bully, threaten and intimidate me into silence,’ he wrote in papers prepared for that case.
‘Why are the Leicestershire Constabulary so interested in the welfare of Greville Janner. Is he a client of the constabulary?’
A good question. But one that would, sadly, never be asked in court.
In May 1994, Frank Beck suffered a fatal heart attack at Whitemoor prison in Cambridgeshire, forcing his appeal to be abandoned.
To this day, many friends believe Beck was innocent, and Janner guilty — though others say there is ample evidence that both men were guilty, and were in fact accomplices.
Eighteen months later, Henning’s judicial review was also abandoned.
He, too, died suddenly and unexpectedly, in a road accident in December 1995, aged 57, before the case could be heard.
‘Ian never saw justice,’ his widow, Dee, told me this week. ‘He had absolutely no doubt of Janner’s involvement in paedophilia, and believed to the end that things had been covered up, and covered up far too easily.
‘We don’t know how many children suffered as a result of that cover up. But at least we are finally starting to see his crimes laid bare in print. Janner may never be prosecuted, but I think Ian would see that as the next best thing.’

Everyone who might have embarrassed the Police or Janner was arrested, threatened or died. Janner still lives in Luxury.
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